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I N T E N T I O N A N D I N T E R P R E TAT I O N I N
H A N S NA M U T H ’ S F I L M , JAC K S O N
PO L LO C K
MICHAEL SCHREYACH
ABSTRACT
Because many of Jackson Pollock’s most familiar statements are multiply
authored, they seem to challenge basic assumptions regarding the transparency
of intention to meaning that they are often presumed to enunciate. The fact
that Pollock’s public declarations about his work are collages, juxtaposing dif-
ferent voices and points of view with his own, complicates our assessment of
their validity as univocal expressions of his intentions. In his film Jackson Pollock,
Namuth utilizes those statements, many of which concern aspects of Pollock’s
technical procedure, as part of his strategy to ground the meaning of Pollock’s
paintings in the process by which his paintings were made. In this essay, I
analyse Namuth’s film as an instance of an anti-intentionalist, causal account
of Pollock’s work. I also point out what I take to be a detrimental consequence
of the reduction of meaning to causes in a discussion of Rosalind Krauss’s
work on Namuth’s photographs; namely, the conversion of the artwork into a
‘text’ or intentionless object. Additionally, I define the intentionalist position,
staking out my view in relation not only to some recent theoretical work con-
cerning intention and meaning, but also to the literary criticism of some of
Pollock’s contemporaries (the New Critics). Finally, I offer an interpretation of
Pollock’s Number 1, 1949 that proceeds from the intentionalist position.
Keywords: Pollock, Jackson; Namuth, Hans; intention; interpretation; Number 1,
1949; index; abstract expressionism; perception; Krauss, Rosalind
He talks with difficulty, searching painfully, almost
agonizingly, for the right word, with constant
apologies for not being ‘verbal’. (Seldon Rodman on
Jackson Pollock, 1956)1
Technique is just a means of arriving at a statement.
(Jackson Pollock, 1950)2
WHEN IN 1951 JACKSON POLLOCK heard his voice-over for the eleven-minute
film Hans Namuth had made about the artist played back, he hated it.3
Perhaps he sounded to himself as he sounds to listeners today: awkwardly
unsure; hesitant and tentative; straining for expression, yet so reticent to speak
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that he delivers his words in a wooden monotone. The recorded vocal perform-
ance fails to convey a sense of Pollock’s familiarity with the ideas he tries to
express, and instead yields only splinters of biographical, aesthetic and technical
information. Moreover, the bulk of his narration contains key words, phrases
and sometimes whole sentences quoted from three previously published sources.
In turn, many of these comments were not, or not primarily, self-generated, but
garnered from friends, critics and his wife, Lee Krasner.4 Pollock begins his
verbal statement by repeating, nearly exactly, biographical details about his
training under Thomas Hart Benton which appeared in a 1944 questionnaire
for Arts and Architecture.5 Most of the remaining remarks come from a statement
published in the only issue of Possibilities, a magazine edited by Barnett
Newman and Robert Motherwell in the winter of 1947–48, and from an inter-
view with William Wright in 1950, broadcast by radio in 1951.6 Parts of the
later interview duplicate the earlier statement, so that when Pollock reuses them
in the film, he triplicates. Additional words and phrases can be tracked to
Pollock’s undated, handwritten statements, and even to a New Yorker review that
appeared in the summer of 1950.7 Namuth, glossing over the contest of egos
famously drawn out by the process of filming, recounts: ‘The text [of the script]
was a communal effort. The three of us [including Paul Falkenberg, the film’s
producer] took bits and pieces from Jackson’s writings and interviews and put
them together.’8
Pollock’s well-known discomfort in explaining himself and his work provides
a productive starting point for investigating certain problems involving ‘artists’
statements’. Of particular concern is determining how statements made by an
artist about his or her working process, or even about the putative meaning
of the resulting artworks, relate to intention. Art historians Fred Orton and
Griselda Pollock suggest that, conventionally, art historians treat artists’ state-
ments as documentary evidence of their intentions and use them to reveal what
an artwork means. In their view, however, this method sidesteps critical inter-
pretation, and as a correction they call for an approach that ‘remind[s] [us] of
the gap between the art an artist makes and what he or she says about that
art’.9 The explanations provided by statements are ‘not necessarily the meanings
that [are] effected by [. . .] picture[s]’.10 Instead, statements are embedded in
forms of political and cultural life which are the necessary grounding for any ut-
terance, as well as any interpretation. Orton and Pollock thus question the often
presumed transparency between artists’ statements and the meaning of artworks,
emphasizing instead the social-historical contexts within which meaning is con-
structed and intention is formed.
Jackson Pollock’s statements challenge basic assumptions regarding the trans-
parency of intention to meaning that they are often presumed to enunciate. The
fact that his few public declarations about his work are collages, juxtaposing dif-
ferent voices and points of view with his own, complicates our assessment of
their validity as univocal expressions of his intentions. Indeed, they might even
call into question the status of intention as privately owned mental content
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available to an individual’s solipsistic reflection. Against such doubt, Falkenberg,
the experienced filmmaker who mentored Namuth during the production of the
film, emphatically defended the validity of this kind of private ownership and
introspection, claiming univocality for Pollock’s narration:
We felt that this film was Jackson’s and that if any voice were to accompany the picture,
it should be his. No critic, however competent and influential, was to tell an audience
what to see [and think]. [. . .] Jackson’s gestures and voice [would] remain ‘authentic’.
These were his very words, the way he felt them, and how he spoke them!11
Perhaps Falkenberg’s insistence on Pollock’s ‘authenticity’ resulted from his
concern that the multiplicity of voices involved in the film’s script might under-
cut the singularity (‘his very words’) that he nevertheless wanted to imagine for
Pollock’s genuine voice (‘the way he felt them’). The tension apparent in
Falkenberg’s testimony motivates me to propose that Pollock’s words should not
in any usual sense be understood as ‘evidence’ of his personal intentions, con-
ceived of as pre-existing ideas or mental plans that are tacitly expressed by
words or artworks.12
Reflecting on the heterogeneity of Pollock’s statements encourages us to revise
and broaden our usual concept of intention, which we often take to mean an
individual’s conscious plan, purpose or goal. Nothing precludes the idea that in-
tention may be formed through some intersubjective or collaborative process, or
that it may unconsciously animate an artist’s practice. Indeed, intention as such
is often recognized retrospectively. Yet as Orton and Pollock suggest, problems
invariably emerge when an artist’s statement is considered to ‘reveal’ the inten-
tion ‘behind’ a work. The danger is to treat intention as a special kind of cause,
and meaning as an effect, resulting in a conflation of meaning with causes that
W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley called the ‘intentional fallacy’.13 Such an
approach assumes that to understand the meaning, we must discover the inten-
tion, usually by reading the artist’s statements as evidence of what he or she
intended. Intention thus appears as something independent of, and temporally
prior to, its realization in the artwork, and meaning becomes divided from it.
But if we maintain the absolute identity of meaning and intention, as I propose
we should, then it is unnecessary to think of artist’s statements as revealing inten-
tion, as if they provide evidence of some cause that putatively precedes the
meaning an artwork is claimed to have. At the risk of some preliminary confu-
sion, I will call the position I advocate intentionalist, by which I mean to
designate a newly conceptualized understanding of intention.
In this essay, I analyse Namuth’s film as an instance of an anti-intentionalist,
causal account of Pollock. Namuth does not interpret the meaning of Pollock’s
paintings, but rather identifies the meaning of his paintings with how they were
made. This point of view is shared by some of the artist’s earlier critics such as
Harold Rosenberg and Allan Kaprow, and extends through the work of more
recent commentators such as Amelia Jones and Jonathan Katz.14 I also point
out what I take to be a detrimental consequence of the reduction of meaning to
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causes in a discussion of Rosalind Krauss’s work on Namuth’s photographs of
Pollock; namely, the conversion of the artwork into a ‘text’ or intentionless
object. Finally, I define an intentionalist position, in relation to some recent the-
oretical work concerning intention and meaning, and also consider the literary
criticism of some of Pollock’s contemporaries (the New Critics). Indeed, I rely
on the artist’s own statements to help make the position I advocate clearer and
in turn offer an interpretation of Pollock’s Number 1, 1949 that proceeds from the
intentionalist position.
Namuth’s film as a causal account
Namuth filmed Pollock in part because he was dissatisfied with dozens of still
photographs he had taken of the painter in the summer of 1950, which in his
view did not sufficiently convey Pollock’s ‘continuous movement’.15 So viewers
would expect the film to highlight the painter’s ‘action’, and to frame this action
as the primary cause of Pollock’s work and the basis of what is most significant
about it. But first we see (and hear) about the many other nominal causes of
Pollock’s work. The voice-over tells us where he was born and when, where he
lives now, who he studied with, what kind of paint he likes. Then we see Pollock
putting on his shoes, smoking a cigarette, kneeling to inspect the surface of a
long stretch of canvas. He paces alongside it. After mixing some nearly dried
paint in a can to restore its viscosity, Pollock begins painting rhythmically along
the length of canvas, hunched to extend the reach of his arm over the horizon-
tal plane. During the editing stage, Namuth interspersed close-ups of Pollock’s
hands and fingers, his furrowed brow in profile, and his balding head, with
long-shots and pans of his measured lateral movement. Leading up to the
action, Pollock stiffly delivers the film script in short sentences, his voice not
quite synched with the cuts between one shot and the next:
My painting is direct.
I usually paint on the floor.
I enjoy working on a large canvas.
[. . .]
Sometimes I use a brush, but often prefer using a stick.
Sometimes I pour the paint straight out of the can.
I like to use a dripping, fluid paint.
On the one hand, Namuth’s visualization of the physicality of Pollock’s tech-
nique and his immersion in his painterly activity accords with the artist’s report
– also voiced in the film – of feeling ‘nearer’ to a large canvas than a small
one, of feeling that he is ‘more a part of the painting’, even ‘in’ it during its
making.16 But on the other hand, the intensity conferred upon the action by
Namuth’s increasingly rapid cuts – a kind of cinematic action extended to
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Pollock’s activity – combined with the awkward fit between Pollock’s narration
and Namuth’s film shots, destroys the continuity Pollock elsewhere expressed of
a ‘pure harmony, an easy give and take’ that he experienced when he was in
‘contact’ with his work.17 This awkwardness culminates in a film-noir scene in
which we see the artist’s stark shadow against a white wall, hunched over,
holding a can, and repetitively flinging paint from a brush or stick that he
swings down suddenly, as if it were a knife or other weapon instead of a pain-
ter’s tool.18
Even if Namuth’s film, in its thematic exaggeration of Pollock’s action, illumin-
ates important aspects of the mechanics of the painter’s technique, it obscures a
viewer’s interpretation of the artworks. Certainly, the director’s handling of
the artist’s paintings undermines the way Pollock exhibited them. Viewers of
the film, unlike those in a gallery, almost never see a work in its entirety.
Accompanied by Morton Feldman’s dissonant cello composition scored for the
film, Namuth cuts from the shots of Pollock’s shadow to extreme close-ups of
some of his canvases, either held as still images, or panned by the camera in
clockwise or counterclockwise movements. These partial shots are followed by
Namuth’s long pan of Summertime: Number 9A, 1948, a painting that is well under
a meter high but five and a half meters long. Yet instead of presenting this pan
shot conventionally – so that it would yield for viewers a sense of camera move-
ment from left to right along the painting’s proper horizontal extent – Namuth
orients the painting at a ninety-degree angle to the film’s rectangular format, so
that it appears to be moving from top to bottom with respect to the frame
(‘pulled slowly beneath the camera,’ as he put it).19 Needless to say, this manipu-
lation negates the particularity of Summertime to the degree that it is rendered
nearly unrecognizable. When in the next shot we see a slow right-to-left pan of
Pollock tacking the painting to a wall in the Betty Parsons Gallery, viewers are
finally given the chance to see two paintings in their entirety, although they are
forced to share the spotlight: Number 2, 1950 (nearest to Lee Krasner, who is
sitting to its right side) and Number 27, 1950. At this moment, Namuth suddenly
cuts to a full-frame shot of just Number 27, 1950. But the painting is shown upside
down.20 In sum, Namuth consistently denies Pollock’s works their proper integ-
rity by framing them in distorted aspects.
Namuth’s account is causal in that it encourages viewers to identify Pollock’s
action as the meaning of his art. Barbara Rose noted the film’s effectiveness in
this regard. From the moment of its screening, she wrote:
the images of Pollock in action attached themselves as additional meanings to his works
to a degree that they began to [affect] the perception of his paintings, which remained
for most people [. . .] largely incomprehensible.21
Helpfully, Rose recognizes a distinction between what the paintings mean and
what the film projects as their meaning. The film, as well as Namuth’s photo-
graphs, ‘provided an alternative to dealing with the difficulty of Pollock’s
painting’. In other words, Namuth substitutes a causal account for
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interpretation: the meaning of a painting, when reduced to action as cause,
becomes manageable.
Yet a defect in the causal account quickly emerges. For in the film it is
unclear what, exactly, might count as a cause of a work. It is basically true that
Pollock’s physical action causes the painting to appear in a certain way. But,
then, are not other less obvious causes – the paint’s viscosity, the earth’s gravity,
the direction of the wind as he paints outdoors – equally important? Is the fact
that he puts on his shoes a cause, or is the fact that he smokes a cigarette one?
In a gross sense, they all are. And Namuth’s use of Pollock’s statements multi-
plies the options. ‘I was born in Cody, Wyoming’, ‘I spent two years [. . .] with
Tom Benton’, ‘I [. . .] paint on the floor’, ‘I [. . .] prefer using a stick’, ‘I pour
the paint straight out of the can’: Namuth converts Pollock’s statements into a
causal litany. Whatever value they might have for interpretation outside the
film’s context, within the film they are not employed interpretatively. Assessing
the film’s numerous details, a viewer has no principle to leave anything out as a
possible cause. Thus everything and anything might become part of the work’s
‘meaning’. Namuth’s logic of causality culminates in the final portion of the
film, where we see Pollock filmed through glass as he paints, exposing the invis-
ible mechanics of Pollock’s action. We get to look, as it were, under the hood of
the car.
The reduction of meaning to causes
The obverse of radical inclusivity is Namuth’s reduction of the meaning of
Pollock’s work to a single cause. In validating action above all other causes,
Namuth converts Pollock’s paintings into surfaces that index action: ‘What is to
go on the canvas [is] not a picture but an event,’ in the critic Harold
Rosenberg’s words.22 Indexes operate by being directly linked to their cause (a
fingerprint is an index of a fingertip), but not all indexes resemble their referents
(while fingerprints resemble the surface areas of fingertips, smoke does not re-
semble fire).23 On the causal account, Pollock’s marks obviously do not
resemble what they are assumed to index, namely his physical actions. The pic-
torial meaning of ‘action’ is not an issue, since the marks that constitute Pollock’s
imagery are seen to be transcriptions of his action above and around the
canvas, indexes of their literal cause; no interpretation necessary. My inclination
is to take Namuth’s emphasis on the putative indexicality of Pollock’s marks to
be an extreme version of the anti-intentionalist, causal position.
In an early assessment of Namuth’s 1950 photographs, taken before he made
the film, the art historian Rosalind Krauss employs the concept of the index to
draw out what she thinks is the significance of Namuth’s pictures for our under-
standing of Pollock’s paintings. In ‘Reading Photographs as Text’, Krauss
polarizes two views of Pollock’s work. In one view, the significance of the pain-
ter’s practice resides in his process or technique. On this side stands not only
Namuth, but also Rosenberg, whose essay ‘The American Action Painters’ of
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1952 is often taken to apply to Pollock. Alternatively, Pollock’s paintings can be
seen as formally coherent works of art delivering an ‘unmediated optical sensa-
tion’ linked to an idea of what Krauss calls an ‘immanence of meaning’.24 On
this side Krauss places Rosenberg’s critical adversary, Clement Greenberg. But
Namuth’s images are relevant to interpreting Pollock’s works, Krauss maintains,
because they reveal the painter’s ‘attack on [this] idea of immediacy’ and hence
on self-evident meaning.
It is useful to focus on details of Krauss’s argument in order to draw out
other implications of Namuth’s causal strategy. Krauss points out that photog-
raphy and film enjoy a special relationship to the real, because they ‘record’
whatever is before the camera’s lens as ‘imprinted indexically’ on its film, ‘like a
footprint in sand’. This indexical relationship, however, has consequences
Krauss wants to avoid. Particularly, she wants to resist the ‘fantasy of an unmedi-
ated relationship to the “real” ’ that photographic indexicality encourages. This
is a fantasy she thinks Greenberg’s ideal of ‘immediacy’ promotes. Krauss
asserts that Namuth’s photographs attack immediacy by creating a ‘rift’ between
the ‘index’ and the ‘real’. She observes that Namuth’s pictures, often taken from
a high vantage point looking down on Pollock and his canvases, ‘recapitulate
that particular angle of vision which was the artist’s own’. She then connects
this high-angle view to nineteenth-century aerial photography. If we convention-
ally understand photography to index the real, then aerial photography –
mainly because it looks so unconventional – makes us question the assumption,
and its imagery demands to be ‘decoded’. It thus ‘prick[s] the bubble of that
fantasy’ of the real to which we were uncritically accustomed. According to
Krauss, this ‘rupture’ of our normal view of photography must necessarily be
extended to our understanding of any photograph we later encounter. It puts us
in the position, as the title of her essay reminds us, of always decoding, of
always ‘reading photographs as text’.
Analogously, Namuth’s camera angle reveals a ‘caesura’ between the (hori-
zontal) conditions under which Pollock marks his surfaces, and the (vertical)
state of apprehending them as finished paintings.25 Once Namuth has revealed
this rupture – like the rupture of the real inaugurated by decoding aerial pho-
tography – it must be carried into our viewing experience of all of Pollock’s
work. Pollock’s paintings, Krauss seems to be saying, are like photographs in the
sense that their indexicality brings them close to the ‘real’ (her scare quotes),
but this should not tempt us to read them in terms of immediacy. Likewise,
Namuth’s photographs and film encourage us to include our knowledge of
Pollock’s causal process in our assessment of his finished works, so that we can
no longer see his paintings as ‘autonomous aesthetic objects’ to be interpreted,
but only as maps of action, or texts to be read. Their causes are now crucially
linked to their meaning.
There are two damaging consequences of conflating meaning with causes.
First, in making Pollock’s surfaces into texts to be read, Krauss transforms
his paintings into intentionless objects. Second, as intentionless objects, their
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‘meaning’ becomes dependent upon an empirical viewer’s experience.
The logic of these transformations starts with the idea that a text is comprised
of signs that must be ‘read’, or made sense of in some way. But in Krauss’s
account, the signs of Pollock’s text (the painting) are indexical. What they index
is both the horizontal position of the canvas as it was being painted and, neces-
sarily, the artist’s action above it.26 Considered as indexes, Pollock’s signs are
thus converted into marks that transcribe their cause (again, ‘like a footprint in
sand’). The implication is that his work must be taken to consist entirely of its
physical features, which reveals Krauss’s commitment to the materiality of the
signifier. In her post-structuralist view, signifiers are empty of meaning in them-
selves. They become meaningful only because of their difference from other
signifiers and by virtue of their syntactical placement. So the meaning of
Pollock’s signifiers – his indexical marks – depends upon the beholder’s judge-
ments regarding competing possibilities of signification, which is to say that
meaning becomes a matter of the viewer’s experience. In reducing signs to
indexes, Krauss transforms Pollock’s paintings into just marked surfaces, objects
to be encountered – not artworks to be interpreted.
The similarity of Namuth’s framing of Pollock’s practice to Krauss’s post-
structuralism might at first be difficult to see. It is hidden because Namuth
emphasizes the apparent signifying potential of Pollock’s technique. But as I
have suggested, this emphasis on action, with its concomitant reduction of
meaning to cause, makes the work of art an object of experience in the same
way that the post-structuralist reduction of the work to a text does. It diverts at-
tention away from the authorial meaning of works of art towards the beholder’s
response. If the process of making the work of art matters to its meaning, then
the interpretation of the work of art will be based on an attempt – inevitably
hopeless – to ‘reconstruct’ that process (the work’s causes), and to attend to the
responses it generates. Viewers will, for example, conflate the meaning of the
artwork with the kinaesthetic reactions they have to the imagined movement of
Pollock’s arm as he spatters an arc of paint across a surface. Or they will equate
the meaning of the artwork with their emotional response to it (an affective
state they might imagine Pollock to have shared). In either case, ‘meaning’ is
assumed to be a matter of a viewer’s experience, and since no viewer will ever
experience quite the same thing as another, meaning becomes contingent, vari-
able and limitless.27
The intentionalist position
Identifying the singularity of the author’s voice as a guarantee of its authenticity
and originality has convincingly been criticized in post-structuralism. What has
also been questioned is the very idea that artworks have a fixed meaning.28 In
our contemporary interpretive context, the meaning of a text is equated not
with the author’s or artist’s or maker’s intention, but with the experiences of
multiple readers. While the objection to the singularity of the authorial voice
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does nothing to diminish the claim that meaning and intention are the same
thing – an intention complexly formed is still an intention – the commitment
to the play of the text not only rejects the idea of fixed meaning, but denies the
claim that intention is the condition for interpretation.
The consequences of rejecting intention as the condition for interpretation
are illustrated by an example from Walter Benn Michaels and Steven Knapp’s
well-known essay, ‘Against Theory’.29 Imagine that a person walking along a
beach encounters a series of marks produced on the sand by a receding wave.
Looking at them, the person realizes that the marks make letters, which spell
out the words to a famous poetic line by Wordsworth. The question is, does
what the person sees mean anything? Is it Wordsworth’s poem he is reading?
Michaels and Knapp argue that answers to these questions cannot be deter-
mined by giving an account of how the marks on the beach were made; the
answers can only be given by asking whether or not the marks were intended to
mean something. And since waves can’t intend anything, the marks they leave
on the beach cannot be meaningful (indeed, on what grounds would we know
the marks are in English, although they look like they are, without recourse to
intention?). Michaels summed up the problem generated by this example in a
recent essay by saying that rejecting intentions
requires the transformation of all marks into the equivalent of [marks on a beach], inten-
tional acts reconceived as natural events. Which is what makes the decision to treat them
as any particular language, or as any language at all, arbitrary. And which thus turns
what they are – because what they are is what they’re treated as – into what they are for
the reader.30
Disregarding intention turns the artwork into an intentionless object, and
Michaels and Knapp’s thought experiment is meant to demonstrate that some-
thing that does not have an intention cannot be interpreted. It would be absurd to
‘interpret’ what an object like a rock or a wave ‘means’: natural events, unlike
intentional actions, require no interpretation. Since intentionless objects do not
mean anything, the object will have significance only in terms of our experience
of it. But describing our experience of something is not the same as interpreting
a work of art.
There is a relevant historical reference point for some of these issues. During
the period of Pollock’s (and Namuth’s) careers, the interpretation of literature
was dominated by New Criticism, the most famous statement of which is the
aforementioned 1946 essay by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, ‘The
Intentional Fallacy’ (and its companion piece, ‘The Affective Fallacy’).31
Wimsatt and Beardsley argue for the public nature of literary language in an
effort to establish an objective criticism of poetry, in opposition to approaches
that conflate the meaning of a poem with the causal conditions – personal,
social, biographical, political, cultural or economic – under which it was
written. Such approaches, they argue, might tell us about what literally made or
allowed it to come into existence, but tell us nothing about the meaning of a
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poem as a work of art. The critic’s job is to interpret the meaning of poems,
and to judge their success as works of art. Both tasks are independent of consid-
ering ‘genetic’ causes, conceived of as any material contingencies that may
impinge upon a writer or artist:
There is a gross body of life, of sensory and mental experience, which lies behind and in
some sense causes every poem, but can never be and need not be known in the verbal
and hence intellectual composition which is the poem.32
As noted earlier, Wimsatt and Beardsley accuse those who conflate causal explana-
tions with a poem’s meaning of succumbing to an ‘intentional fallacy’. The
term is rather unfortunate, because they clearly do not oppose intention as I
have been discussing it – indeed they are wholly committed to it. Rather, they
are against using the limited idea of intention as the ‘design or plan in an
author’s mind’ as a criterion either for determining the correctness of interpreta-
tion or as a statement for making evaluative judgements.33 In a later essay,
Wimsatt clearly distinguishes two opposed understandings of intention, claiming
that the author’s ultimately illusory ‘generative intention’ (intention as pre-
formed mental plan that causes the work of art to come into existence) is a part
of a whole ‘cluster of genetically oriented ideas (inspiration, expression, authenti-
city, sincerity, purpose, and the like)’ which attract ‘simpler kinds of
intention-hunters’ but do not express ‘a right view of literary “intention” ’.34 In
another context, the English critic F. R. Leavis expressed this ‘right view’ by
writing:
[The critic] is concerned with the work in front of him as something that should contain
within itself the reason why it is so and not otherwise. [. . .] [I]t is true that extraneous in-
formation may make him more percipient. But the business of critical intelligence [is] to
ensure relevance of response and to determine what is actually there in the work of art
[. . .]. Intentions are nothing in art except as realized, and the tests of realization [. . .]
may very well reveal that the deep animating intention (if that is the right word) is some-
thing very different from the intention the author would declare.35
This ‘deep animating intention’ is precisely the meaning of the work of art.
Anti-intentionalists substitute casual accounts for interpretation, thereby relin-
quishing claims about meaning.
Interpreting Pollock
Interpreting the meaning of artworks is identical to interpreting artistic inten-
tion. In a study of abstract painting, Charles Harrison has argued that it is
precisely the ability of a viewer to interpret the artist’s intentions as realized in
the artwork that defines aesthetic sensitivity, and permits her to ‘achiev[e] some
sympathetic understanding of the conditions and concepts under which those
intentions may have been formed’.36 But it is clear that Harrison is not talking
about intention in a narrow sense, as a pre-formed mental plan. Approvingly,
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he cites Richard Wollheim’s view that intention – which for Wollheim simply is
the meaning of a work of art – can be conscious or unconscious.37 This flexible
notion of intention as something partially known – in other words, partially
unknown, even inscrutable – implies for Harrison that ‘to assess the outcome of
an intentional action (such as a work of art) it will therefore not be enough
simply to ask what the artist meant’.38 The critic cannot rely on statements as
avowals of the work’s meaning; she must also see what the artist has done.
Pollock, as I will show presently, would concur.
At the outset of this paper, I exploited the collaborative nature of Pollock’s
statements as a chance to problematize the issue of intention and meaning. I
would like now to return to Pollock’s statements in order to demonstrate their
commensurability with the intentionalist position I have been advocating. For
while those statements might not directly address what particular paintings
mean, they do express the painter’s views on intention. Pollock evidently
thought intention was a combination of conscious and unconscious motives:
‘When I am in my painting,’ he said, ‘I’m not aware of what I am doing. It is
only after a sort of “get acquainted” period that I see what I have been
about.’39 Here, Pollock disputes the idea of intention as a mental plan. But else-
where he insisted that he could ‘control the flow of the paint’.40 He boldly
declared, ‘I deny the accident,’ and shot off a telegram to Time magazine com-
plaining ‘NO CHAOS DAMN IT’ after a critic disparaged the seeming
indeterminacy of his work.41 Evidently the painter sensed no paradox in admit-
ting unconscious intention yet denying chance: ‘It doesn’t make much
difference how the paint is put on,’ he remarked, ‘as long as something has
been said. Technique is just a means of arriving at a statement.’42 How a work
of art is made (consciously or unconsciously; with a stick or a brush; horizontal-
ly or vertically) is significant only insofar as it realizes an intention.
Arguably, what Pollock means when he insists that technique is a means of ar-
riving at a statement finds a compelling parallel in Robert Pippin’s recent analysis
of Hegel’s concept of agency. Pippin argues that Hegel rejected the division of
an act into a prior and discrete interior intention that putatively causes an agent
to act, and the exterior unfolding of the deed in a social context. Indeed, Hegel
pried apart the notion of intention from what Pippin calls the ‘uniquely first-
personal and self-certifying intra-mental deliberative faculty’ often assumed as
foundational for an individual’s sense of her own agency.43 Pippin’s Hegelian
view is that intention is not an originally determinate or privately owned mental
content, but is rather revealed or detected in a deed that unfolds in a social
world that precedes the agent. The individual ‘arrives at’ his intention (the
content of his ‘statement’) after he acts. The agent learns his intention from the
deed, one might say after a ‘get acquainted’ period. Pollock, like Hegel, chal-
lenges the causal model of agency in which actions are understood to result
from an individual’s originary, proprietary and executive powers.44
My point is that taking statements as evidence of what the artist ‘meant’ (as if
some putative intra-mental event that ‘causes’ a work of art could be discovered)
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is a large part of the problem I have been discussing. Pollock, too, cautions us to
ignore causes (techniques and means) and to focus our attention on the work of
art (what has been expressed, the ‘statement’). And this requires a sustained en-
gagement with, and interpretation of, the perceptual effects Pollock intended to
produce.
Admittedly, Pollock’s paintings are often bewildering; hence the temptation to
rely on statements by the painter as causal explanations, or on one’s affective
responses – in short, on anything that might help the viewer understand what
at first seems incomprehensible. But an approach to Pollock’s individual paint-
ings which was analogous to the New Critics’ approach to individual poems
might be worthwhile pursuing. Only a rudimentary attempt can be made here,
but let me adumbrate what such an approach might entail. Looking at Number
1, 1949 – one of the classic poured or dripped paintings Pollock made between
1948 and 1950 – it is difficult for a viewer to select from the surface any single
pictorial incident that seems to impinge upon attention more than any other.
Like the uniformly dispersed pictorial incidents, our eyes’ focus and our mental
attention are all-over, finding no place to rest and centred nowhere in particular.
This thwarting of visual equilibrium has implications for how we interpret the
modes of experience or consciousness Pollock wants to express. Yet once the
gaze is suspended at the pulverized centre of the painting, another effect grad-
ually occurs. It is not exactly that the centre of the painting becomes clarified,
but that an elliptical area around the centre of the painting, about four feet
across, appears as an area of relative stability, set off against a fringe of amorph-
ous or unstructured activity that appears to surround it. The emergent structure
given by this perceived ellipse slightly counters the all-over quality of the
surface.
What are we to make of these perceptual effects? I propose that the effect of
visual degradation in Number 1, 1949 is achieved as if in opposition both to a
sense of the perceived limits of the image (where it appears to end) and to a
sense of the picture’s physical edges, its frame (where it literally ends). Simply
put, the surface’s de-differentiation, its uniformity and lack of hierarchy, com-
promises the power of its external boundaries, perceived or literal, to establish
pictorial structure. At the same time, though, the internal framing of the ovoid
provides a certain emergent structure to the image which restores to the paint-
ing a degree of pictorial cohesiveness that is more or less independent of both
its perceived limits and the literal frame, as if the pictorial structure is now
understood to be generated from the inside out, from the interior of the image
to its frame, rather than the other way around, and creates sense of the painting
as a whole. I would suggest that the constitution of that totality – a structure
that serves as a medium for expressive content, versus a merely literal shape –
is to be understood itself as emergent from the figurative depth of the field, not
given beforehand.45 The total visual field then, far from being an accumulation
of marks that are taken as traces or indexes of his movements or actions above
the canvas, can be understood to be expressive of something like the subject’s
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emergence to the world, and of the freedom of his or her creative intentionality.
On this account, Number 1, 1949 conveys something about the conditions of ex-
perience through which a reflective subject might grasp the significance of her
embodied modes of intentionality – her own deep animating intentions.
Anti-intentionalism, it is true, can motivate the historian to turn to other
helpful explanatory frameworks outside the work, where useful analyses of the
social, biographical, political or material contexts within which the work is em-
bedded can be developed. However, as important as these contextual analyses
can be, in them the task of interpreting the meaning of the work itself often
yields to accounting for its causes. The work of art is treated as a result of
certain pressures, an effect of its context’s causing. I furthermore have tried to
show that such accounts will terminate in the reduction of the artwork to a kind
of intentionless object, the significance of which is determined only by our
responses to it. Since objects do not have meaning in themselves, whatever sig-
nificance they do have is what they have for us, and the task of interpreting the
meaning of the work can lapse into describing our experience of the work’s
effects on us. But describing our experiences is not interpreting. Descriptions of
experience, unlike claims about what the work means, are not open to question
or argument. As I have suggested, Namuth’s film is an extreme example of the
causal position. The director conflates the meaning of Pollock’s work with its
causes; he is concerned neither with intention nor with interpretation. Let me
repeat what Pollock himself said about the matter, a claim with which the inten-
tionalist critic would be quick to concur: ‘It doesn’t make much difference how
the paint is put on as long as something has been said.’46 What gets said is
exactly what the artist meant or intended, and it is the interpreter’s task to try
to understand what is being said, and among the things that are being said, to
determine what about them is meaningful.
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